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ABSTRACT 
THE PARADOX OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN FORCED DISPLACEMENT  
AND RESETTLEMENT CAUSED BY THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
This article is an investigation of the theoretical and empirical concept of local 
participation, as it is used in the field of development-induced forced displacement 
and  relocation  (in  short,  DFDR).  Local  participation  has  repeatedly  proved  to  be 
relevant with respect to the decrease of the negative impacts caused by DFDR on the 
people involved. Paradoxically, people who contribute to this process with their very 
culture  and  means  of  existence  –  including  their  land  –  often  end  up  in  chronic 
poverty,  despite  their  participation  in  local  decision-making.  It  appears  that  this 
concept,  which  was  developed  precisely  in  order  to  protect  perso n s  a f f e c t e d  b y  
poverty and supporting them in their attempt to overcome this poverty, contributes 
nevertheless to the destruction of their local culture, which shows signs of “inside 
cracking”. 
Hence  the  necessity  to  answer  two  questions:  is  the  concept  of  local 
participation deceitful or is it used erroneously? Do we need to reinterpret and rethink 
the way the project is conceived, planned and executed, taking into account its crucial 
elements with respect to risks and compensations? This approach se em s to m e to  
constitute a way to overcome blockages and avoid considering negotiations as an 
inflexible,  univocal,  hierarchical  relation  between  two  parties  blocked  into  an 
asymmetrical power game without any possibility to escape from it.  
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I have used the example of the hydroelectric dam project in Zimapán, Mexico, 
as a starting point for an ethnographic discussion of local participation
2. 
 
Key words: local participation, development-induced forced displacement and 
resettlement (DFDR), chronic poverty, local culture. 
PARTICIPATION – WHAT IS IT REALLY ABOUT? 
Local participation has repeatedly proved its relevance for dealing with the 
negative impacts of DFDR projects caused by larger infrastructure development 
constructions.  Although  I  in  this  article  will  use  the  case  of  dam  building  to 
exemplify my reasoning, the conceptual discussion is valid for different kinds of 
projects, such as mines, building of highways and recreation and resorts parks that 
have  a  displacement  and  resettlement  component.  The  concept  of  local 
participation, despite its verified strengths, I will argue cannot in its present form 
reconcile  the  contradictions  between  the  negotiations,  participation  and  the  fait 
accompli decisions leading up to the building of the dam. To come to a deeper 
understanding  of  what  is  happening  on  the  ground  in  such  projects  with  the 
purpose of refining the methodologies governing participation and negotiations it is 
necessary  to  study  the  interaction  between  the  main  parties  during  the 
implementation phase
3.  
The contradiction between the concepts “involuntary” and “participation” has 
been  recognized  by  Horowitz,  Koening,  Grimm  and  Konate  (1993)  whose 
statement is still valid for many DFDR projects:  
 
It  is  perhaps  oxymoronic  to  speak  of  ‘participation’  in  reservoir-driven 
relocation,  since  the  move  is  inherently  involuntary.  Yet  successful  resettlement 
depends in very large part on an active participation of those forced to move (1993, 
p. 242).   
 
Local  participation,  thus,  is  in  DFDR  projects  a  conceptual  contradiction. 
Nevertheless, this is the best concept we have.    
Apart from its oxymoronic characteristics, “participation” in its present form 
together with the expert knowledge that has been developed to mitigate the pain of 
displacement  also  seems  to  contribute  to  the  undermining  of  the  culture.  It  is 
possible  that  insufficient  attention  is  being  paid  to  the  identification  and 
reconstruction  of  more  intangible  sociocultural  assets  that  could  be  labeled  the 
‘glue’  of  society.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  reduce  these  intangible  assets  to 
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something  esoteric  and  irrelevant  for  the  economic  compensation.  Instead,  the 
intangible assets are interwoven and sometimes interchangeable with the economic 
assets of the society and it would be difficult to correctly estimate the economic 
assets  without  considering  the  symbolic  meanings  associated  with  them.  For 
example,  the  people  of  Zimapán  called  the  fruit  trees,  which  were  their  main 
economic asset, for “our children”. Hence, they lived from the trees but also for the 
trees with all its implications. One of the objectives with local participation is to 
comprehend, intellectually and emotionally, another person’s life world and then 
facilitate  and  convert  this  knowledge  together  with  the  affected  people  (not 
necessarily as a communicator) into efficient compensations. 
Much  critical  scrutiny  has  been  directed  toward  the  implementing  party’s 
modes  of  power,  to  how  they  have  justified  themselves  and  their  acts  at  the 
expense of the affected people. And rightly so, it has been necessary to focus a 
spot-light on the unequal power relationships between the main actors: on the one 
hand, the implementing party with its extensive human, technical, economic and 
political resources, and on the other hand, the affected local people with their less 
extensive resources of all kinds in addition to their lack of experience. In contrast 
to the implementing party, the locals are doing this for the first time. They have no 
“lessons  learned”  to  fall  back  on  –  until  it  is  too  late  and  the  displacement  is 
executed. An apt choice of words were made by one of the resettled in Zimapán in 
the new village some years after “Now they should have resettled us. Now we have 
the experience to negotiate” (April, 1997). He was right. In a dam project with a 
resettlement  component  there  is  no  way  of  turning  back  the  clock,  of  undoing 
decisions. The original village is physically gone for ever covered with water. This 
makes  the  negotiations  with  its  local  participation  to  the  engine  of  the  entire 
project. The locals will have to live with the consequences of the negotiations and 
the decisions made during the implementation. The implementing agency, on the 
other hand, will write a final report and move on. It is a question of life contra 
lessons learned. Considering what is at stake, it is an almost inhuman responsibility 
that is put on the shoulders of the locals, but also on the implementers. There is no 
project  manager  in  her/his  right  mind  who  will  not  consider  moral  and  ethical 
values  related  to  human  rights  and  “just”  compensation  when  the  negotiations 
begin with the local people. 
Of  course,  the  local  people  must  be  taken  seriously  and  they  should  be 
equipped with the necessary negotiation skills and knowledge about how DFDR 
projects  works  in  order  for  them,  as  independent  agents,  to  respond  to  the 
implementing  party’s  arguments  at  the  negotiation  table.  This  is  known  as 
empowerment, a concept that is widely used in policy documents and discussions 
on  poverty  reduction  (Tamondong,  2008;  Cernea,  2008;  Fernandes,  2008). 
Empowerment  and  local  participation  are  nevertheless  based  on  that  the  local 
people  are  aware,  or  made  aware,  that  their  own  choices  and  socio-economic, 
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displacement, resettlement and compensation. They have to be critical of their own 
thinking and understand that their choices will have real consequences. On the 
other hand, the experts/implementers have the responsibility and accountability to 
inform about potential pitfalls in the locals’ reasoning and choices. But this does 
not eliminate the tricky situation that came up in Zimapán when the local people 
and  the  experts  arrived  to  diametrical  opposite  solutions  to  the  central 
compensation issue of replacement land. The experts opposed the peasants’ claim 
to cash payment based on their lessons learned from other similar projects around 
the world. I will return to this.  
If we consider that most DFDR projects are implemented during a very short 
and intensive period lasting a few years (Zimapán four years), it is easy to realize 
that the local people, as mentioned, are almost put in an impossible position. To be 
able to participate as equals at the negotiation table, they have to objectify their 
lives and social relations, culture and economic livelihood. They have to take a step 
back and evaluate their present life and formulate priorities what they would like to 
save  and  change;  what  they  identify  as  good  and  bad  traditions.  They  have  to 
verbalize  matters  that  they  have  taken  for  granted  in  their  cultural  and  natural 
landscape of heritage and they have to come to terms with feelings of loss and 
confusion.  Theoretically three time dimensions come into play  simultaneously: 
past, present and future (Aronsson, 2002; Downing, 1996). 
The  implementing  agency  in  the  negotiations  has  its  own  agenda,  logic, 
preconceptions and symbolic language that govern its objectives and interaction 
with  the  local  people.  It  would  be  a  simplification,  however,  to  reduce  this 
interaction to the binary oppositions “the donors in total control and power” and 
“the receivers in total lack of control and power”. 
Local participation is a heavy responsibility for both parties.
4 But in reality it 
might  be  so  that  an  interest  in  shared  responsibility  exists  only  as  long  as  the 
project runs, because as soon as the people are out of the reservoir area they have 
lost  one  of  their  main  means  for  putting  pressure  on  the  implementers  in  the 
negotiations. Project delays cost. Hence, for each negotiation step agreed upon they 
come closer to their physical move and powerlessness. In an ideal world this would 
not  be  a  problem  because  the  implementing  partner  would  continue  its 
responsibility  and  keep  to  its  word.  Unfortunately,  the  case  studies  of  DFDR 
projects  present  another  picture  and  that  is  of  betrayal,  corrup t i o n ,  l a c k  o f  
transparency and weak bureaucracies.  
We know that this is the case in many DFDR projects, but nevertheless I 
would like to stress that if local participation is practiced, then a social field of 
interaction is created between the parties consisting of intersubjective relations, 
expressed as a struggle for Being. This field of interaction could not satisfactory be 
reduced to a one-way-communication, an asymmetrical power relationship or a 
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paternalistic  approach  or  local  empowerment.  Our  present  terminology  and 
understanding are insufficient because the process was much too complex to be 
reduced to the problem of the power position of the implementing party, or to the 
assumed powerlessness of the local people, or to insufficient planning, or to a non-
interested and badly trained expert group, or to lack of funding. I am not saying 
that an asymmetrical power relationship did not exist. I am only trying to show, 
through an ethnographic case study, that it would be a simplification to reduce a 
complex course of events to one single concept such as “power” or put the “blame” 
on one single party. I found that something new was created between the parties 
that could help us understand both the outcome of the negotiations and some of the 
ground rules in play during the implementation phase. This new field was a highly 
dynamic field that fluctuated with time and space and when I tried to grasp it, it 
slipped away and took on a new shape.   
But what are the problems with local participation in DFDR projects? When 
do they occur in the project cycle? Who is a problem? In the extensive literature on 
participation  and  development,  useful  concepts  have  been  identified,  such  as: 
‘institutional  partnership’,  ‘joint  control’,  ‘shared  benefits’,  ‘joint  decision-
making’,  ‘consultation  with’,  ‘consultation  on’,  ‘local  participation’,  ‘informed 
participation’, ‘popular participation’ and many more (e.g. Amparo, 2000, Bliss & 
Neumann, 2008). There is, however, always a risk that a good concept becomes a 
buzzword, as Messer and Shipton with accuracy of aim describe:   
 
“Participation” is sometimes honored more in lip-service than in practice, for 
it always sounds nice – and at worst it can be just an empty development buzzword 
or a smokescreen for authoritarian planning. Nor is it so easy to achieve: rare is the 
case where all people whose lives are to be affected by a program of policy can 
realistically be actively involved in its planning, even if they wish to be (something 
not to be assumed) (Messer & Shipton 2002, p.238).  
 
Consequently, the concepts are thrown into all kinds of reports and texts, 
sometimes with no consideration for their importance and meaning. Lip-service or 
not,  I  prefer  to  see  the  refinement  of  the  original  concept  as  an  expression  of 
seriousness and the will to do good and no harm. But there is a tendency for the 
concept to become explicatory per se; it is as if we think that if we put a name and 
a label on the problem the solution will come by itself. This is actually a kind of 
magical thinking and in this way, it can even obstruct our understanding of what is 
happening on the ground because the problem is hidden behind the concept that 
once was developed to identify and solve a particular issue.   
The problems, or challenges, with local participation begin when the decision 
is made to build a dam and the legal rights to expropriate land for the common 
good are used. The decision is most of the time already fait accompli when the 
local people are asked to participate. Here we can thus chose to stop the imaginary 
discussion of local participation and from the position of power say to the local 
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be  built  because  we  have  made  the  decision  that  a  dam  is  necessary  for  the 
development of the country. But if you participate, your chances to rebuild your 
society  will  increase  dramatically  because  you  will  help  us  understand  what  is 
important in your culture and identify the economic framework necessary for you 
to rebuild your society. Otherwise we, the outsiders, will have to try to make these 
decisions for you. It’s your choice.  
In  the  above  paragraph,  the  problems  with  DFDR  projects  and  local 
participation are purposely nakedly and naively described. The local people face 
the  option  of  accepting  the  decision  made  above  their  heads  and  turn  to 
negotiations,  or  they  can  resist.  But  what  the  above  paragraph  also  implicitly 
describes is the problem of the implementing party. In DFDR projects there are 
social  scientists  hired  to  consult  with  the  local  people.  They  do  all  kinds  of 
different studies, including powerful and in-depth economic evaluations, or at least 
the methodology is there to do it, as Cernea states, although it might in practice not 
be fully used (2008, p. 33). To participate as a social scientist/resettlement expert in 
these kinds of projects implies that one is very well aware of the unequal power 
positions that exist between the main parties, at least at project start. But power 
positions can change in the course of the project cycle, as was the case in Zimapán, 
where the main stakeholders (the power company CFE and the peasants) alternated 
power  positions  depending  upon  negotiation  issue,  strategy  and  plain  luck. 
Nevertheless, the social scientist knows that at the regular meetings with the head 
engineer of the technical division she will always be asked – When are the people 
out  of  the  reservoir  area  (Downing,  1998:  PC).  This  is  what  the s o c i a l  
scientist/resettlement expert carries with her when she initiates, educates and tries 
to rouse enthusiasm for local participation. Social scientists/resettlement experts 
are squeezed in-between the local people and the project’s technical/management 
staff.  Many  social  scientists,  NGOs  and  human  rights  organizations  take  the 
position that local participation is an illusion in the context of DFDR projects. 
Are there any alternatives to the incompatible concepts of participation and 
forced displacement? Yes, one option is to discuss the building of a dam with the 
affected people. This is a solution that the World Commission on Dams suggested 
already  in  the  year  of  2000.  The  commission’s  members  consisted o f  
representatives of the dam industry, researchers and NGOs. They wanted to ensure 
that the people were compensated adequately and that only dams that truly benefit 
the  locals  would  be  built  in  the  future  (Thayer  Scudder,  1998.  PC;  World 
Commission on Dams, 2000). What is the implication of this statement for local 
participation? First of all it would require a meeting with the locals and questions 
had to be asked? What is your opinion of building a dam at this site? It would mean 
that you have to resettle. It would mean that your animals (in a rural project) would 
not be able to graze here. It would mean that your house would be destroyed. In 
what way would a dam contribute to your quality of living? Only people in great 
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probably only agree to a smaller dam with less impact on the natural and cultural 
landscape. A person of a more strategic turn of mind would say, of course, people 
are not thrilled, but the information and the questions have to be formulated in an 
attractive manner. Issues like better health care, better schooling, a modern life 
style  and  compensation  should  be  emphasized.  But  wouldn’t  that  b e  a  w a y  o f  
manipulating people? And how does that correspond to the concept of informed 
participation? It not only seems to me that we are moving dangerously close to the 
fine line between ‘information’ and ‘manipulation’, but also it becomes evident 
that each DFDR project is context dependent and the consequences of that is to 
find a balance between blue print implementation and a widening of what we mean 
with participatory space. 
A second option is to limit the legal right to expropriate land for the common 
good, that is, for developmental purposes. For example, in India, since more than 
10 years there are pressures to change the right of eminent domain. Legal theorists 
explore the possibility that land may be viewed in terms of limited “use rights” 
(Ramanthan, 1996, cited in Downing & Garcia, 2002, p. 20; Ramanthan, 2008). 
The limitation of the right to expropriate land for developmental purposes is a 
radical  approach.  It  is  a  politically  explosive  question  that  will  have  deep 
consequences for the nation as a whole, if realized, and for many aspiring fourth 
world nations.  
The  role  of  eminent  domain  in  DFDR  projects  has  become  central  for 
questions of compensation in both private and public projects (Ramanathan, 2008; 
Fernandes,  2008;    Price,  2008;  Cernea  &  Mathur,  2008).  Cernea,  for  example, 
argues that eminent domain should not be an instrument for land acquisition for 
private project purposes. Instead, such deals should be a business deal based on 
willing buyer and seller negotiations without state interference (2008, p. 73). This 
should always be the case, but the idea of a willing buyer and seller negotiation is 
the ideal world; in some cases the original project is not suitable to be launched and 
it is good that it is stopped, and in other cases it is a valid project, but some people 
refuse  to  participate  and  move  regardless  of  compensation  and  purpose  of  the 
project. These cases are individually tragic and every time it happens it is a failure 
for the project implementers. But I am of the opinion that from a broader point of 
view, the society must have legal instruments to deal with these cases, although I 
recognize that the problems are always in the details and that the legal instruments 
can be misused.  
The  mass  expropriation  of  land  for  developmental  purposes  in  DFDR 
projects is, however, another issue and totally unacceptable is if compensation is 
insufficient  and  not  well  integrated  with  development  aspects  and  local 
participation is not practiced.   
Regardless of solution, local participation is still on the agenda. Participation 
is developed to involve people in the project, but participation might also have the 
unexpected  (?)  consequence  that  people  who  participate  do  not  resist  the   Inga-Lill Aronsson  8  44 
dam/development project. If people are too busy participating, it might obstruct 
them from thinking about resistance, as was noted in the Zimapán case
5. In addition 
to this, as in all dam projects, a gradual destruction of the natural and cultural 
landscape  occurred  that  seemed  to  have  undermined  the  peoples’  trust  in  their 
Umwelt that resulted in a feeling of being lost in the world without any other option 
than to participate. Consequently, the very tool participation that was developed to 
protect the people had in the hands of the implementers become a tool to support 
their own interest.  
Over and over again we have to keep in mind that there is an asymmetrical 
power relationship between the actors that cannot be ignored. But, if we are going 
to take participation seriously and go beyond the obvious in order to bridge that 
inequality, we have to focus on the social field that is created between the actors in 
the negotiations during the implementation. As participation is practiced today, it 
cannot bridge the gap between peoples’ needs, wishes and hopes for the future, and 
the reality of the DFDR project. We seem to encounter a paradox; the present form 
of local participation does not fully mitigate and compensate the hardship of the 
resettlement, but it also appears to contribute to the undermining of the local culture.  
 
THE WORLD BANK AND PARTICIPATION 
 
According to the most recent World Bank operational policies on involuntary 
resettlement “Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should have 
opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs 
(OP 4.12 & 2b Dec 2001). This is a highly important statement. The World Bank 
guidelines  on  involuntary  resettlement  go  back  to  Michael  Cernea’s  ground-
breaking work from the early 1980s (OMS 2.33 from 1980 & OPN 10.08 from 
1986).  It  was  published  in  1988  as  Involuntary  Resettlement  in  Development 
Projects and in this version Cernea formulates the participation concept as “it is 
incumbent upon the agencies involved in this planning to seek the participation of 
the  resettlers”  (Cernea,  1988,  p.  14).  And  further  that  “affected  populations  be 
consulted  –  directly  or  through  their  formal  and  informal  leaders  (…) 
Dissemination  of  information  about  the  impending  relocation,  about  resettlers’ 
rights, compensation procedures, available choices, etc is an indispensable premise 
for participation (Cernea, 1988, p. 14–15).  
These already two-decades old formulations are still valid and used in DFDR 
projects,  but  equally  true  is  “the  need  to  reform  resettlement  as  it  is  currently 
conducted and financed”, as Cernea concludes in his article (2008:1). Why? The 
researchers in the book Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? (Cernea & 
Mathur,  2008  [eds])  highlight  cases  and  conceptual  ideas  showing  that  in  the 
majority  of  the  DFDR  projects  the  resettlers  become  impoverished  and  do  not 
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benefit from the development project per se. A major reason for these failures, and 
one might even say betrayal towards the resettlers, is that the compensations are 
insufficient  and  badly  managed.  One  solution  would  be  to  make  sure  that  the 
people who contributed with their main asset, their land, become recognized as 
shareholders  and  investors  in  the  project  under  construction  through  different 
benefit-sharing  mechanisms  (Cernea  &  Mathur  2008  [eds],  Égré  &  Roquet  & 
Durocher 2008, Nakayama & Furuyashiki 2008, Trembath 2008).  
Compensation, negotiations and participation go hand in hand and one cannot 
be  without  the  other.  Consequently,  this  complicates  the  picture  and  as  Scott 
Guggenheim said “Negotiations with villagers can be quite protracted “(1993, p. 
218).  Guggenheim  was  the  World  Bank’s  resettlement  expert  in  charge  of 
Zimapán. Guggenheim identified two main problems that complicated the process 
of participation. One problem was the socio-economic stratification of the villages 
and the second problem was the top-down governed institution that was not used to 
participatory  approaches  (1993,  p.  217).  In  regard  of  the  stratification  a 
clarification  is  necessary.  Social  stratification  per  se  is  not  the  problem.  The 
problem is to identify and incorporate the stratifications into the negotiations with 
the use of the participatory model.  
Guggenheim touched implicitly on a third problem when he after watching a 
raging argument between company officials and several hundred angry peasants 
established that “This was not the way to begin a participatory project” (1996, p. 
1). He was right. The turmoil was an expression of the fact that the World Bank 
and  the  power  company  (CFE)  had  underestimated  the  requirements f o r  t h e  
implementation  of  the  participatory  aspects  in  regard  of  time,  methods  and 
ethnographic base-line data in combination with an overestimation of the effects of 
high  level  institutional  changes  as  regards  time,  distance  and  political  and 
organizational will to let the changes trickle down to the local level. The most 
important aspect from the peasants’ perspective was that the project had put in 
motion deep socio-economic and political changes within their society long before 
any official meetings took place
6. The expressions of turmoil before a project even 
has reached the implementation stage, raises serious questions about our theoretical 
understanding of a linear and teleological project process with a starting and ending 
point well demarcated in time and space. It seems there is a dissonance between 
format and content, or between the resettlers’ life rhythm and expectations and the 
imaginary project cycle, which the present form of participation has difficulties to 
overcome. Consequently, despite elaborated and viable project plans many projects 
have proven themselves not viable especially in regard of the re-establishment of 
the economic production base.  
The  World  Bank  report,  Resettlement  and  Development.  The  Bankwide 
Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986–1994, states that the 
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involuntary  resettlement  operation,  despite  its  size,  is  treated  as  a  subsidiary 
component (1994, p. 2/7). Further, it is argued that “Too often their feasibility 
studies  display  an  ‘engineering  bias’  and  underestimation  of  social-cultural 
variables, an approach that backfires later during project execution (1994, p. 3/9). 
The problem, as I see it, is less a problem of “underestimation” of the local social-
cultural variables than a lack of understanding of the dynamic field of interaction 
that  is  created  between  the  parties  during  the  implementation  phase.  This 
constructed in-between-space is filled with socio-cultural expressions, but foremost 
it is a space where power and economic muscles are flexed and estimated. If we 
take  local  participation  seriously  (as  we  should),  we  cannot  exclude  the  most 
powerful  actor,  the  implementer,  in  the  project  because  that  would  give  us  a 
skewed view of a dynamic relationship – a view that often divides the main actors 
in two groups: the “bad guys”, who are the implementers, and the “good guys”, 
who are the resettled people. This is a simplification of reality.  
 
PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Negotiations in DFDR projects can be protracted, complicated and confusing. 
The  parties  get  exhausted,  meetings  escalate  in  number  and  can  take  almost 
ritualized forms, whereby the actors take on their respective roles and fulfill their 
obligations towards their audiences. This is valid for both the implementers and the 
resettled peoples’ representatives. This is the front stage. There is, however, also 
often a back stage where negotiations take place with a few selected members.  
This influences the transparency of the project and can create  problems on the 
ground, because the local resettlement team, who are not part of these high level 
negotiations, can be put in awkward positions vis-à-vis the local people who are 
dependent  upon  information  from  either  their  representatives  or t h e  l o c a l  
resettlement team. Rumors are abundant in these kinds of projects and they often 
create tensions between the resettlers and the implementers. An argument in favor 
of  transparency  would  be  that  it  might  diminish  the  spread  of  rumors  and 
corruption  from  both  sides.  A  further  argument  is  that  transparency  foster 
empowerment because people are faced with facts and consequences. I believe we 
must strive towards transparency, but sensitive information must also be guarded in 
these kinds of overwhelming projects that otherwise could hurt the project and the 
resettlers. We must find, hence, either a balance between transparency, integrity 
and information or if we demand total transparency, we must also demand total 
responsibility from all parties involved. More research is needed because there is 
not sufficient empirical research on the concepts of ‘transparency’ and ‘trust’ in 
DFDR projects with documented participatory methods.  
The implementer has a history and an agenda that influence the negotiations 
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known for its previous badly managed resettlement projects. The agenda is often 
clear and that is to complete the project and present practical results within defined 
economical  and  temporal  frames.  The  people  and  the  participatory  aspects  are 
elements in the bigger scheme of the project. They are elements who during a 
certain delimited period of the project must be in focus, because the people have to 
be resettled in order to make room for the reservoir area. This is the reason why the 
resettlers  never  are  “irrelevant”  for  the  implementer.  On  the  contrary,  the 
implementer is very well aware of the power position of the people, because any 
project delays are highly costly. In a participatory project, the people should also 
be aware of this power position and make use of it.  
The  implementer,  as  an  institution,  is  anchored  in  a  national  and  global 
reality with an objectified view of people and nature. Such a view is necessary, 
because  as  an  institution  it  cannot  operate  with  a  localized,  emotional  and 
subjective  world-view.  But  every  institution  consists  of  real  people  and  social 
groups and I believe many of the professionals in these organizations that execute 
DFDR projects experience a conflict between their professional and personal roles. 
Professionally, they are forced to adhere to a global view of men and nature as 
replaceable. Otherwise, they could not justify their own life and work. At the same 
time, many of them could relate and connect to the local people through their own 
life experiences – a piece of land or homestead or fruit garden. As human beings 
they meet and connect and communicate. But on a structural level this connection 
seldom  becomes  internalized,  which  strongly  influences  the  texts,  reports  and 
documents produced to enhance the quality of the project resulting in difficulties to 
grasp the resettlers’ world with the purpose to understand what they need to rebuild 
their society. Hence, there is a gap between what the local resettlement staff knows 
in their “heads” and what comes out in print. This might be an epistemological 
problem,  but  I  prefer  to  see  it  as  a  methodological  problem.  If  we  could  find 
methods and words for closing this gap and transfer the knowledge and feelings 
that  the  local  resettlement  staff  has  acquired  into  the  documents  and  the 
negotiations and connect them to the economic units of analysis, much would be 
won.  How  can  we  extend  our  language  to  cover  and  make  understandable  the 
subtleties of Being-in-the World and transform these into comprehensible terms 
usable for the negotiations and the economic recovery? 
The participatory model would gain if negotiation rules where formulated. I 
believe that such rules, thoroughly worked-out together with the negotiation parties 
might  facilitate  the  negotiations.  Such  rules  would  not  prevent  problems  and 
conflicts, but it would be something real to refer to, paragraphs to point to and 
recommendations of behavior instead of ending up accusing each other of all kinds 
of things. I am not sure if these rules must be formulated as a legal contract with 
possibilities  of  sanctions,  or  if  a  moral  contract  would  be  sufficient.  A  legal 
contract has the advantage of the possibility of suing the other party, but would that 
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concept that is basic for all social interactions and crucial for getting results in the 
negotiations.  What  are  the  elements  of  trust?  On  an  individual  level  it  is  a 
psychological reaction to verbal and non-verbal communication. Although I reject 
a total relativistic position, the signs and interpretations are culturally and socially 
conditioned. When we talk about trust we enter into moral and ethical domains and 
if trust should be made operational in the negotiations, both parties have to identify 
and verbalize their domains and not assume that they share the same – although 
they might be surprised when they discover that they share more than they thought.  
If the model of reality for the implementer is necessarily based on ideas of an 
objective world with replaceable places, the model of reality for the resettlers’ is 
the  opposite.  Their  land  and  place  is  imbued  with  emotions,  cultural  symbols, 
social memories and economy. It is not thought of as replaceable, but it might 
become  replaceable.  It  is  not  only  a  romantic  illusion,  but  also  a  pejorative 
approach, that some people are unable to move and change their lives. People have 
always migrated, travelled, raised children and lived far from their native countries 
and birth places, either voluntary or involuntary. Resettlement in not impossible, it 
is the way it is being done that makes the difference.  
The concept of ‘denial’ is sometimes used when describing the reactions of a 
resettled  people-to-be.  It  is  argued  that  the  people  experience s u c h  a  
multidimensional stress that they deny the facts of the coming displacement. They 
not only deny, but they also continue their life under the motto of “business as 
usual” (Scudder & Colson, 1982, p. 269–270). There are certainly cases of this 
kind, but equally there are other reasons for this “business as usual” and “denial”. 
One practical reason is that there is no other choice than to continue life, because 
the  project  cycle  is  so  long.  The  people  can  also  make  a  rational  economic 
calculation based on available information about the possibility for the project to be 
a reality. In Mexico, the Zimapán peasants made the correct assumption that the 
Mexican government would not be able to raise enough money for the project. 
What they did not know, however, was that the World Bank was prepared to fund it.  
My  point  is  that  one  should  never  underestimate  peoples’  intellectual 
capacity  and  reduce  them  to  victims.  Victimization  has  nothing  to  do  with 
participation. On the contrary, I see it as a dangerous degradation of the affected 
people that inhibits local initiatives, local knowledge and complicate the creative 
communication process between the parties in the negotiations. 
Agenda is another issue in negotiations based on participation. To have a 
carefully prepared agenda is essential for the resettlers’ ability to participate and 
meet the demands at the negotiation table. An agenda is the foundation for a well 
functioning participation, and the other way round, informed participation is the 
basis for a well prepared agenda. To develop an agenda is difficult for the local 
people because of their non-experience with DFDR projects. They simply do not 
know what is expected from them and what they will encounter. In Zimapán the 
agenda  was  defined  nine  years  after  the  technical  start  of  the  project  and  this 
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In sum, the resettlers and the implementer are guided in the negotiations by 
decidedly different points of departure. The implementer is always negotiating as a 
unit, while the resettlers struggle with social stratification originating in the access 
to resources, which in turn is deeply embedded in the history of the place. Literally, 
families fall apart due to the negotiations, because of complicated webs of socio-
economic relations and structures, whereas concurrently the land that always had 
been a “moral and spiritual entity” (Croll & Parkin, 1992, p. 18) physically changes 
in  front  of  their  eyes  and  becomes  de-spiritualized.  The  local  people  always 
negotiate  about  cultural  key  symbols  (e.g  land,  river  and  trees)  that  are 
encapsulated in social times. The implementer negotiates about an objective piece 
of land that can be replaced. To be able to negotiate, the resettlers have to take part 
in the objectification of their natural and cultural landscape and they are forced to 
take a step back and observe their culture, which in the process is emptied of its 
meaning carrying elements. Their way of life must be quantified and deconstructed 
to fit the present form of negotiations. This is nothing mystical, but essential for 
everything related to compensation. The key is to be able to quantify, but keep and 
improve the qualitative “essence” of the objects under negotiation. In my opinion, 
local participation is successful if the parties with joint efforts manage to mediate 
and operationalize the qualitative aspects of the material asserts to be compensated.  
An interesting question, however, emerges when looking into the recent discussion 
on benefit-sharing and investment for resettlers (Cernea & Mathur 2008 [eds]). 
Does benefit-sharing and investment make the above discussion obsolete, because 
the resettlers will hopefully get enough financial muscles to decide what matters 
are qualitatively worth keeping?  
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Does shared responsibility mean shared accountability in a well-functioning 
participatory  project?  Most  resettlement  experts  are  of  the  opinion  that 
accountability  could  never  be  equally  shared  because  of  the  present  unequal 
positions of the parties in DFDR projects. Responsibility, on the other hand, could 
be  shared.  Downing  &  Garcia  (2002)  strongly  argue  for  the  need  of  a  clearer 
defined accountability (risk-liability) on the part of the implementer. They would 
like to have a system that enables the resettlers to not only be paid in case of 
injuries  but  also  retain  the  right  to  sue.  “The  resulting  system  regularizes 
obligations and transforms an uncertainty into fixed cost” (2002, p. 18). – A system 
of  regularized  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  implementer  would  most  highly 
influence the negative behavior of certain implementing agencies.  
But  let  me  despite  the  above  statement  continue  to  elaborate  on w h a t  
participation  should  be  about.  Participation  means  discussing  matters  in  a 
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Decisions are arrived at by vote or consensus and the consequences are understood 
by all involved who declare that they are ready to take on this responsibility.  
It is therefore a contradiction in a participatory project to blame one of the 
agents, regardless if it is the implementer or the representatives of the resettlers. If 
the implementing agency is to carry the entire accountability, which is argued by 
the resettlement experts, it is not a participatory project and should therefore be 
called something else. Let me return to the ethnographic case of the Zimapán dam. 
The peasants’ made the decision not to accept the restitution land offered by the 
implementing  agency  (CFE).  Instead  they  wanted  cash  payment.  (The  general 
standpoint  among  resettlement  experts  is  to  advise  against  cash  compensation).  
What could the CFE have done? Should they have refused to follow the will of the 
local people? It was a majority decision made in a democratic way, according to 
the peasants that I interviewed. If the CFE would have refused to follow the will of 
the  peasants,  they  would  have  been  accused  of  hegemony  by  the  international 
community.  If  the  World  Bank  (who  was  not  informed  but  later)  would  have 
objected, they also would have been accused of not respecting the people. In the 
end a large cash payment was paid to the community. Some times  later I was 
informed by the peasants that the money in the bank was not for everyone in the 
villages, but only for the landowners, which in reality meant a new socio-economic 
stratification of the community based on money. 
A major risk with the present form of participation is that if something goes 
wrong one can always put the blame on the local people, who thus become victims 
of  the  participatory  model  that  was  developed  to  protect  them.  Again,  in  the 
Zimapán project, I heard how exhausted and frustrated the local resettlement team 
was (CFE), when they had to face decisions by the peasants’ that they thought were 
wrong. Over and over again they ended up saying “It is their decision, their choice, 
they wanted this”. The scary thing was that it was their decision and the CFE could 
not do anything about it.  
If only the implementer is accountable in a participatory project, they will 
never be able to meet the resettlers on equal terms in the negotiations. The agency 
in charge will guard its position and the progress with iron hand. Dialog will never 
occur,  because  the  agency  will  not  risk  anything,  and  most  probably  the  local 
people will either be reduced to passive receivers, beneficiaries or become very 
angry people. And, when things get out of hands, we are back to blaming the 
victims because they are said not to make responsible decisions or are unable to 
understand information, or to blaming the implementers who are accused of not 
taking people seriously enough, or do not practice informed participation or are in 
general crocks.   
From the field of humanitarian action with a similar complex of problems 
with local participation and responsibility, I would like to quote Jan Egeland
7 who 
writes a personal account from the war in Iraq and the bombing of UN staff in Bagdad.   
                                            
7 Former  UN  undersecretary-general  for  Humanitarian  Affairs  and  Former  UN  Emergency 
Relief Chief.   15  The Paradox    51 
A bad process leads to individual colleagues paying the price. The system 
must learn from this. However, now we see managers so afraid of not being careful 
enough that they retreat into risk aversion in conflict situations where you cannot 
assist  and  protect  civilians  without  some  degree  of  risk.  Retreating  to  bunkers, 
evacuating staff, and avoiding contact with the people in the crossfire is not the way 
we should work. (2008, p. 20–30). 
 
We have to decide how we would like to work with local participation in 
DFDR projects. In all projects someone has to make the final decisions and in 
DFDR projects with participation that someone has to base the decisions on the 
most appropriate knowledge available. It should not matter if this knowledge is 
local knowledge or expert knowledge. The only criterion valid is its functionality. 
Knowledgeable decisions are dependent on an existing creative dialog between the 
main parties based on local, informed participation in a trustworthy environment.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Regulating responsibilities and accountabilities are important, but we have to 
work on several levels simultaneously with participatory projects. It is necessary to 
raise the negotiation skills of the resettlers in order for them to be able to meet the 
level of skills of the implementer. The skills involve, as Downing & Garcia (2002, 
p. 25) lift forward among others, training, support, legal advises and knowledge 
about DFDR projects. Both parties must also be supported through out the project 
cycle. Coaching and de-briefing are pedagogical methods used in other fields of 
society and which can easily be adapted to fit DFDR projects.    
During the implementation phase many complex relations, issues and matters 
entangle and disentangle within the field of interaction between the main parties. 
Some of these have been identified as multifaceted risks by Cernea (1997 & 2000) 
and  are  used  for  deconstructing  and  reversing  the  risks  of  impoverishment  in 
resettlement  projects.  The  risk  model  has  been  discussed  and  tested  by  several 
resettlement  researchers  (e.g.  Downing,  1996;  Thangaraj,  1996;  Pandey,  1998; 
Nayak, 1996 and 2000), and is now an integrated part of DFDR project planning. 
The model is used as a preventive tool by both the implementing party and the 
affected people and underlies the recent discussion on reforming resettlement by 
focusing on the economic and financial foundations of planning DFDR projects 
(Cernea, 2008). These risks, according to de Wet (2006), are part of the “inherent 
complexity” of resettlement projects which would require a particular complex and 
risk-sensitive approach
8. Cernea  argues in the same  vein that “The outcome of 
straitjacketing  resettlement  is  a  reductionist  approach  to  resettlement’s  intrinsic 
complexity, which backfires on strategies, limited inputs, and routine solutions” 
(2008, p. 29). 
                                            
8 Inspired by Aronsson (2003). Chris de Wet, personal communication (Dec 2006).   Inga-Lill Aronsson  16  52 
From my experience it is a question of lack of appropriate methods to deal 
with unexpected problems that explain why both parties during the implementation 
phase  approached  problems  in  an  ad  hoc  manner  leaving  the  impression  of  a 
chaotic  project  similar  to  an  impressionistic  art  installation  (Aronsson,  1992,  
p. 2002). It seemed that both parties lacked understanding and methods to deal with 
complicated “chaotic” issues, not only the mentioned risks, but also such that were 
related to their own structures and cultures. Both parties groped in the dark when 
they faced unexpected results and problems which led to unexpected behavior and 
new  turns  in  the  negotiations.  Sometimes  the  unexpected  situations  and  results 
were not only constructive, but also “good to think with” and sometimes even fun 
revealing so much about the human being. My point is that we should not be afraid 
of these chaotic situations, but instead learn to work with them and incorporate 
them in our methodological toolkit.  
The  standard  methodology  in  development  project  is,  according  to  David 
Ellerman, that the “doers of development” deliver ready made answers and know-
how  to  a  passive  group  of  receivers,  a  “pedagogy  which  sees  the l e a r n e r s  a s  
essentially passive containers into which ‘knowledge’ is poured” (2000, p. 17). But 
this view on pedagogy “only reinforces the clients’ passivity and perceived lack of 
self-efficacy” (ibid 2000, p. 18). According to Ellerman this is a mechanical view 
of  the  learning  process,  one  that  creates  dependency  and  disempowerment. 
Furthermore, the “doers of development” own the knowledge, it is an investment, 
and therefore there is little space for correcting mistakes (2000, p. 18–20). He seeks 
learning  methods  that  help  people  to  help  themselves.  Ellerman’s  argument  is 
similar  to  what  Robert  Chambers  claimed  in  the  book  The  Volta  Resettlement 
Experience  (1970).  Chambers  argued  that  self-help  would  have  been  a  better 
solution than accepting aid from the government. He stated that the affected people 
would have gained by resettling themselves, rebuilt their houses and economic base 
on their own initiative, instead of being resettled by the government (1970, p. 15). 
(I have criticized this view in an earlier text, Aronsson 2002). Chambers’ argument 
is similar to David and Pat Turtons’ reasoning on spontaneous resettlement due to 
extended drought in Ethiopia. They argued that although relief actions could have 
saved lives in a short perspective, they might have destroyed a way of life (1984,  
p. 179). No one, of course is suggesting that aid should not be delivered to people 
in need. What is of interest here is how we look at the form, length and content of 
aid-development in order not to do harm, destroy or interrupt a functioning local 
subsistence system.  
In the above discussion, I see similarities to the problems we face in DFDR 
projects. The disruption of local systems and their rebuilding are crucial in all these 
projects.  Numerous  resettlement  researchers  and  practitioners  are  trying  to 
understand  why  development-induced  impoverishment  persist  (e.g.  Cernea  & 
Mathur, 2008; Cernea 2005, 1999, 1997; Downing, 2002; Scudder & Colson, 1982; 
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Robinson, 1993 & 1994; McDowell, 1996; Nayak, 2000; Thangaraj, 1996, Pandey, 
1998; Buil & Bergua, 1998; Nahmad & Mejía, 1994). I am not suggestion that we 
should turn away from DFDR projects, but I am seeking a methodology (and a 
theoretical frame) that forces us to use existing lesson learned but at the same time 
break with the tradition of trying to pin-point each single step in the project cycle 
that  only  prevent  us  from  recognizing  unexpected  solutions  and  dealing  with 
unexpected (chaotic) events. I suspect that in the few cases of successful DFDR 
project  there  are  elements  of  chaos,  but  there  were  also  people  (resettlers  and 
implementers) who could see and use these unexpected confused situations and 
turn them into something creative.  
The model I am seeking is a model that can deal with unexpected things, both 
problems and solutions. Such a model must be open-ended, flexible, dynamic and 
sensible to the complexities and subtleties of life; a model that can deal with both 
humor and trust. I am ambivalent to a too rigid model. Sometimes I think that we 
are trying to plan something that cannot be planned. Maybe we should turn around, 
loosen up and work with frames instead of detailed schemes. Instead of seeing the 
chaotic, impressionistic happenings as threats and failures, we could use them to 
find tailor-made solutions for each particular project. Today we take for granted 
that  blueprint  planning  is inadequate.  I  suggest  the  blueprint  implementation  is 
nothing to strive for.  
However, the use of an open-ended methodology for the implementation will 
put great demands on all actors involved. Especially on the resettlement staff in 
charge of the implementation, because they have not only to master elaborated 
field methods, but as Michael Jackson writes: 
 
Through inept questioning and endless guesswork you struggle to get your 
bearings, seeking an underlying pattern which will render everything comprehensible 
and clear. Understanding is a product less of your methodology than your mastery of 
basic social skills. And this demands time and perseverance (1995, p. 21).  
 
And more, both parties, in a participatory project have to learn to master one 
another’s universe. Local knowledge has to interact with general knowledge and 
vice  versa.  This  is  a  didactic  perspective  that  demands  active  learning 
methodologies.  But  local  participation  should  never  be  reduced  to  a  pedagogic 
problem, or as in actor analysis (Hermans & El-Masry & Sadek, 2002) to a “game” 
between more or less rational agents. The greatest disservice the local people and 
the experts alike can do to themselves is to underestimate the complexity of local 
participation and the interaction between the two of them, because not even the 
following  statement  is  valid  anymore;  that  the  local  people  have  not  asked  to 
become resettled. Tamondong (PC 2007) told me that people all the time ask to be 
resettled,  which  puts  the  resettlement  team  in  a  kind  of  complicated  situation. 
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LINKS BETWEEN RESETTLEMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION? 
The World Bank (1980, 1986; Cernea 1988) was a forerunner, as already 
mentioned,  in  the  formulation  of  guidelines  focusing  on  resettlement  and 
displacement. Today many international organizations and agencies have similar 
guidelines:  IDB,  AfDB,  EBRD,  IFC;  OECD,  ADB
9.  The  main  bulks  of  policy 
documents  came  in  the  1990s  and  are  similar  in  their  formulations.  I  have 
commented  twice  on  the  World  Bank’s  resettlement  guidelines  (in  1995  and 
1997/98)  and  was  a  member  of  a  resettlement  group  consisting  of  researchers 
interested in these issues. We made a joint statement to the World Bank, where we 
objected heavily to the formulation about the restoration of livelihood by stressing 
the importance of improvement, not only restoration. I believe  Thayer Scudder 
spoke for many of us when he made the below sharp statement.  
 
Their  effectiveness  is  undercut  by  a  single  phrase  pertaining  to  resettling 
households and communities that requires borrowers to “at the very least restore 
their former income-earning capacity and living standards”. That phrase makes a 
mockery of any commitment to making resettlement projects development projects 
because, all too often, it allows borrowers to merely replicate pre-existing poverty 
(1999. Internet source). 
 
I  mention  the  above  history  because  it  shows  the  direct  involvement  of 
researchers  in  the  painstaking  formulations  of  word  for  word  in  the  guidelines 
which have had an impact on the lives of thousands of resettlers. This work has 
continued with undiminished force and one of the latest contributions in the field of 
poverty  reduction  in  DFDR  projects  is  Cernea  &  Mathur  (eds)  book  Can 
Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? (2008), as mentioned earlier. In this book, 
Susan  Tamondong  contributes  with  a  paper  called  Can  Improved  Resettlement 
Reduce Poverty?
10 When this paper was presented for the first time in 2003 it was 
regarded as a provocative text because many organizations and researchers are of 
the  opinion  that  it  is  impossible  to  resettle  people  in  a  way  that  gain  them. 
Consequently, they make the conclusion that there is no way that resettlement can 
be linked to poverty reduction. Tamondong’s main argument is that resettlement 
can  reduce  poverty  and  the  poor  could  gain  if  policy  recognizes t h e  n e e d  t o  
improve  peoples’  living  standard  by  treating  resettlement  as  a  development 
program. Policy must avoid restoring poverty among the marginalized, poor and 
politically  weak  people  because  “Displaced  people  who  are  poor  may  become 
poorer  and  those  who  are  not,  could  also  be  impoverished  if  compensation, 
mitigation and development programs are not properly implemented” (Tamondong, 
                                            
9 Inter-American  Development  Bank;  African  Development  Bank;  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development;  International  Finance  Corporation;  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development; Asian Development Bank. See respective web-pages.  
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2003, p. 10). In her later version (2008) she has sharpened the arguments stressing 
the need to create national legislations and the necessity to facilitate the connection 
between national policies and international standards. In this line of thought, the 
ADB has developed a poverty reduction partnership agreement that is meant to 
harmonize between the bank and the countries that have signed the agreement. In 
February 2004 twenty-four countries had signed on allowing a targeted poverty 
reduction  procedure.  But  to  achieve  improvement  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
provide financing mechanisms that do not only cover the replacement costs, but 
truly improves the living standards in DFDR projects, claims Tamondong (2008).   
Somehow, hidden in the text, is an interesting discussion about “invisible” 
people who are landless poor occupying public land until the land is acquired for 
public purposes. These “invisible” people disperse and become visible again in the 
urban slums  of the major cities. They are a large  group and Walter Fernandes 
(2008) reports that in India 60 million people have been displaced between 1950 
and 2000 and many of them (nobody knows how many) have never been resettled. 
That is, nobody knows where they have disappeared and how they survive and, of 
course, they have never been considered to have any compensation rights.  
There are also “invisible people” in well-demarcated DFDR projects who can 
only with difficulties be identified and in the best cases be compensated. But the 
compensation in those cases are, to my knowledge, seldom sufficient, because in 
the informal economy many items are “borrowed” (or actually shared) within the 
community  on  a  long-term  basis,  but  after  a  displacement,  when  the  informal 
economy is scattered, and the formal monetary economy has taken over, cash is 
never shared, and nobody lends anybody anything, because there  is no way of 
paying back. Everybody knows. The social relational setup between the people is 
changed which has serious consequences for their possibilities to make a living. 
This is one of the components of the “falling-apart from within” which has to be 
addressed if resettlement is aimed at reducing poverty.   
From  my  point  of  view,  local  participation  is  a  very  complex  issue  that 
involves the concept of change. I strongly believe that local knowledge should not 
be  regarded  as  something  that  cannot,  or  should  not  be  changed  or  contested. 
Change is inevitable if we accept the tool of informed participation. I think that 
internal  change  of  the  pre-resettled  community,  triggered  by  participation  and 
negotiation, might be one of the elements that cause a society to disarticulate in the 
implementation phase, but also to survive and gain. The challenge is to identify and 
let these mechanisms work in favor of the people and their society. I am convinced 
that the link between DFDR projects and poverty reduction strategies goes through 
local  participation,  negotiations  and  this  dynamic  social  field  that  is  created 
between the main parties during the implementation phase. There is no way around it.    Inga-Lill Aronsson  20  56 
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